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REMARKS: Tabs A-C		
FROM: NIO/AL (David Low)		
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FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 01749-85
2 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: David B. Low
Acting National Intelligence Officer at Large

SUBJECT: Visit By Ambassador Stoessel, Chairman of
the Chemical Warfare Review Commission

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1. The purpose of the Commission is to assess the US chemical warfare posture and evaluate the adequacy of US chemical warfare deterrence by examination of (1) the requirement for a US chemical retaliatory stockpile, (2) the adequacy of the current stockpile, and (3) whether the US should proceed with binary munition production or other actions. The membership of the Commission can be seen at Tab A.

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2. On 13 March 1985, I coordinated an Intelligence Community briefing for the Commission covering Soviet CW production and stockpile, delivery and protective capabilities, force structure, training, R&D, and policy and doctrine.

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3. The Ambassador and several members of the Commission have more recently visited Europe to study first hand the CW issue from the point of view of our European-based forces and our NATO allies. Most of the

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SUBJECT: Visit by Ambassador Stoessel, Chairman of the Chemical
Warfare Review Commission


visits seem to me to have been of limited value, with the exception of
the discussions in Paris which were quite candid and comprehensive.

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4. The Commission's original target date for a report was 1 April.
This was not a realistic possibility and the new target date is evidently
now 1 June. I also understand that Commission members plan to testify
before Congress in late April as part of the Defense Appropriations
debate.

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David B. Low

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 01481-85

18 March 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: David B. Low
National Intelligence Officer at Large

SUBJECT: 13 March 1985 Intelligence Community Briefing
for the Presidential Chemical Warfare Review
Commission

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1. After the briefing last Wednesday (see Agenda attached), I was told by Ambassador Stoessel, who is acting as chairman of the Commission, that the briefing was excellent. He was particularly pleased that, while we had prepared a coordinated text for the briefings, we allowed the various points of view held by DIA, Army, CIA, etc., to be aired on the various issues. General Cavazos, a member of the Commission, also commented that "you guys are really telling it straight."

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2. I suppose it was predictable that now the hard-line elements in Army/OACSI and DIA are unhappy with how the Commission has interpreted the briefings. We now hear that a "consensus" of the Commission is that they did not feel a sense of urgency about the CW threat as a result of the briefings. DIA and OACSI evidently feel that presenting the worst case Soviet conventional CW threat is essential to approval of the binary program.

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
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SUBJECT: 13 March 1985 Briefing for the Presidential CW Review Commission

4. I can give you a firmer recommendation when I see the final memo, but my immediate impression is that we should not allow ourselves to be dragged more deeply into this quagmire. Having given it our best shot, we might as well let DIA and the Services do what they wish by way of further briefings for the Commission.

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A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'D B Low', with a stylized, cursive script.

David B. Low

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TAB C

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP, NATO, PARM
SUBJ: CW COMMISSION DISCUSSIONS IN PARIS, MARCH 25

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: IN CANDID AND COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSIONS, FRENCH MFA AND MOD REPS PROVIDED CW COMMISSION MEMBERS INSIGHT INTO FRENCH POLICY GOVERNING CHEMICAL WARFARE DETERRENCE AND ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS IN GENEVA, BUT STRESSED THAT THEIR COMMENTS WERE NOT FOR DIRECT ATTRIBUTION. FRENCH INDICATED THAT OFFICIAL POLICY WAS TO SEEK NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO CW PROBLEM, BUT IN THE INTERIM AND IN FACT EVEN IN THE EVENT THAT THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS SUCCEEDED, FRANCE WOULD CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE PROTECTIVE MEASURES/EQUIPMENT FOR FRENCH FORCES, CW RESEARCH, AND CAPABILITY FOR RAPID PRODUCTION OF CW MUNITIONS. REGARDING THE LATTER, FRENCH STRESSED THAT THE DECISION BY POLITICAL AUTHORITIES TO PRODUCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY DEPEND ON THE ADVENT OF HEIGHTENED TENSIONS IN EUROPE OR RISK OF IMMINENT CRISIS. FRENCH POLICY BASED ON CONCERNS REGARDING APPARENT SHIFT IN SOVIET CHEMICAL WARFARE STRATEGY TOWARD SELECTIVE, TACTICAL USE; THE PROLIFERATION PROBLEM; THE POSSIBILITY OF BREAKOUT FROM ANY AGREEMENT BANNING CW; AND THE PROBABLE LACK OF ADHERENCE BY SOME COUNTRIES TO SUCH AN AGREEMENT. ON ARMS CONTROL, THE FRENCH REITERATED THEIR SENSITIVITIES TO THE INTRUSIVENESS OF ARTICLE 10 VERIFICATION MEASURES, AND STRESSED NEED TO TAKE MORE CAREFUL LOOK AT COMPLEXITIES OF THE 10-YEAR REGIME FOR REDUCTION/ELIMINATION OF CW ARTICLE 6. ON THE U.S. MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, FRENCH ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE PRODUCTION OF BINARY MUNITIONS WOULD CERTAINLY ENCOURAGE THE SOVIETS TO NEGOTIATE MORE SERIOUSLY IN GENEVA; BUT THEY WERE HIGHLY SKEPTICAL REGARDING POSSIBLE EUROPEAN ROLE IN ANY POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENT SCHEME. END SUMMARY.

*Also working on
Binary themselves.*

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